Official deviance and corruption have taken place at both the individual and unit level since the founding of the PRC. Initially the practices had much to do with the danwei (literally, “unit”) system, an outgrowth of communist wartime organs. In the PRC the reforms of Deng Xiaoping were much criticized for making corruption the price of economic development.
Emergence of the private sector inside the state economy in post-Mao China has tempted CCP members to misuse their power in government posts; the powerful economic levers in the hands of the elite has propelled the sons of some party officials to the most profitable positions. For this, the CCP has been called the “princelings’ party”, a reference to nepotistic corruption in some periods of Imperial China. The relatives of several prominent political leaders are reported to have generated large personal wealth in business, including relatives of former Premier Wen Jiabao, current CCP general secretary Xi Jinping, and former Chongqing party secretary Bo Xilai. Attacking corruption in the CCP was one of the forces behind the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.
The politically unchallenged regime in China creates opportunities for cadres to exploit and control the rapid growth of economic opportunities; and while incentives to corruption grow, effective countervailing forces are absent.
Corruption in all levels has long been a major public complaint, and there is certainly no shortage of cases
Institutionalized corruption takes toll on the Chinese people
Both structural and non-structural corruption has been prevalent in China. Non-structural corruption exists around the world, and refers to all activities that can be clearly defined as “illegal” or “criminal,” mainly including different forms of graft: embezzlement, extortion, bribery etc. Structural corruption arises from particular economic and political structures; this form is difficult to root out without a change of the broader system.
Weak state institutions are blamed for worsening corruption in reform-era China. Corruption in China results from the Party-State’s inability to maintain a disciplined and effective administrative corps. The Chinese reform-era state has also been an enabling factor, since state agencies have been granted regulatory power without institutional constraints, allowing them to tap into new opportunities to seek profits from the rapid growth in businesses and the economy. This takes place at both the departmental and individual level. Corruption here is part of the dilemma faced by any reforming socialist state, where the state needs to play an active role in creating and regulating markets, while at the same time its own intervention places extra burdens on administrative budgets. Instead of being able to reduce the size of its bureaucratic machinery (and therefore opportunities for corruption), it is instead pressed to expand further. Officials then cash in on the regulatory power by “seeking rents.”
In 1989, the main claims of the pro-democracy movement included asking the government to conduct political reform, to curb corruption and privileges enjoyed by the children of top leaders, to publicize the income of the governmental officials, and to stop media censorship.