Background
Participants
Timeline
Tens of thousands of university students begin gathering spontaneously in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, the nation’s symbolic central space. They come to mourn the death of Hu Yoabang, former General Secretary of the Communist Party. Hu had been a symbol to them of anti-corruption and political reform. In his name, the students call for press freedom and other reforms.
Demonstrations escalate in Beijing and spread to other cities and universities. Workers and officials join in with complaints about inflation, salaries and housing. Party leaders fear the demonstrations might lead to chaos and rebellion. One group, lead by Premier Li Peng, second-ranking in the Party hierarchy, suspects “black hands” of “bourgeois liberal elements” are working behind the scenes to undermine the government. A minority faction, led by Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, believes that “the student mainstream is good” and that their patriotism should be affirmed, “although any inappropriate methods of action should be pointed out to them.”
Li argues that the protests should be “nipped in the bud;” however, Zhao convinces them to wait, stating, “Our main task right now is to be sure the memorial service for Comrade Yaobang goes off smoothly.”
More than 100,000 university students assemble outside the Great Hall of the People, where Hu’s memorial service is being held. Three students carry a petition of demands up the steps of the Great Hall and insist on meeting Li Peng; he does not respond. Over the next days, the students boycott classes and organize into unofficial student unions — an illegal act in China.
With Zhao Ziyang on a state visit to North Korea, Li Peng calls a meeting of the Politburo, a meeting dominated by Party members antagonistic to the students. They convince Party elder Deng Xiaoping, the de facto head of state, that the students aim to overthrow him and the Communist Party. Deng decides the Party has thus far been “tolerant and restrained,” but the time has come for action. “We must explain to the whole Party and nation that we are facing a most serious political struggle. … We’ve got to be explicit and clear in opposing this turmoil.”
“The Necessity for a Clear Stand Against Turmoil,” appears in the state-run newspaper, the People’s Daily. This editorial closely follows the opinions expressed by Deng at the meeting the day before. “This is a well-planned plot … to confuse the people and throw the country into turmoil,” it reads. “… Its real aim is to reject the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system at the most fundamental level.”
The editorial sets off more demonstrations in other cities. In Tiananmen Square the ranks of protestors now include a cross-section of society. “In Beijing one in 10 of the population was joining in … all of the old people, all the little children, so it was massive,” explains Jan Wong, a foreign journalist in Beijing at the time. “You had doctors and nurses and scientists and army people demonstrating. The Chinese navy was demonstrating, and I thought, ‘This is extraordinary because who’s left? It’s just the top leaders who aren’t out there.'”
Party leaders are aware of the growing foreign press coverage of the demonstrations, but remain split over how to stop the protests and get the students to return to classes. Zhao Ziyang’s camp advocates negotiation and stresses the government should address legitimate complaints, such as the need for political reform. Li Peng and his allies argue that social stability must be restored before any reforms can be considered.
Tens of thousands of students march into Tiananmen Square to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the 1919 “May Fourth Movement,” which also took place in the square. They pledge to return to classes the next day but intend to keep pressing for reforms.
Zhao Ziyang, in a speech to foreign bankers, expresses support for the students’ “patriotism” and essentially contradicts the government’s April 26 editorial. This angers senior Party members.
Many students return to classes, and the movement is in flux and lacks clear leadership. Certain factions plan more demonstrations and a hunger strike. Meanwhile, tensions escalate within the Party as they prepare for Soviet Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s historic visit to Beijing.
Deng Xiaoping wants to settle things peacefully, but insists the students must be out of the square before Gorbachev arrives. Zhao, unable to convince the students to call off the demonstrations, begins to lose favor with the senior Party members.
Anticipating Soviet Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit, about 160 students begin a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square, citing the government’s failure to respond to their requests for dialogue. One of the printed manifestos reads: “The nation is in crisis — beset by rampant inflation, illegal dealing by profiteering officials, abuses of power, corrupt bureaucrats, the flight of good people to other countries and deterioration of law and order. Compatriots, fellow countrymen who cherish morality, please hear our voices!”
Their hunger strike draws broad public support; many important intellectuals pledge their help. “There’s such a feeling in China about food because of the thousands of years of famines that they’ve had,” explains Jan Wong. “… So when the students went on their hunger strike, it really moved people to tears.”
Mikhail Gorbachev arrives in Beijing for the first Sino-Soviet summit since 1959, but the hunger strike forces the government to cancel plans to welcome him in Tiananmen Square. His escort is blocked by protestors on nearly every street in Beijing. “For the Chinese government, this was a big loss of face, very scary,” says Jan Wong. “… They were aware of what was happening in the Soviet Union — and so were the Chinese people — that the Communist Party in the Soviet Union was more or less imploding. The Party leaders were very frightened in China.”
More than 3,000 people are now participating in the hunger strike. The embarrassing protests during Gorbachev’s visit further polarizes the Politburo. During an emergency meeting, Zhao maintains that the way to end the strike is for the government to retract its April 26 editorial, accept the students’ demand for dialogue and begin reforms.
“The vast majority of student demonstrators are patriotic and sincerely concerned for our country. We may not approve of all of their methods, but their demand to promote democracy, to deepen the reforms and to root out corruption are quite reasonable,” says Zhao.
Li Peng insists the government cannot capitulate: “It’s more and more clear that a tiny minority is trying to use the turmoil to reach its political goal, which is repudiation of Communist Party leadership and the socialist system.” Li says. “Their goals are to topple the Chinese Communist Party … to completely repudiate the people’s democratic dictatorship.”
When the case is put to Deng Xiaoping, he decides against Zhao’s recommendations and proposes instituting martial law to end the hunger strike. “The aim … will be to suppress the turmoil once and for all and to return things quickly to normal,” he is reported to have said. “This is the unshrinkable duty of the Party and the government.” Zhao expresses his problems with this position but concedes: “I will submit to Party discipline; the minority does yield to the majority.”
Zhao Ziyang visits hospitalized hunger strikers and tries to convince them to call off their fast. Afterward, he is reported to have drafted a letter of resignation to the Politburo, but it is never sent. Li Peng holds a televised meeting with student leaders in the Great Hall of the People. It ends without any progress.
That evening a meeting of Party elders and Politburo members, including Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng, approves the declaration of martial law. Zhao Ziyang does not attend.
Student leaders learn of the plan to declare martial law and call off their hunger strike. Instead, they stage a mass sit-in in Tiananmen Square that draws about 1.2 million supporters, including members of the police and military and industrial workers. Zhao Ziyang appears in Tiananmen Square in a final, unsuccessful effort to appeal for compromise. It is his last public appearance. He is soon removed from office and replaced by Jiang Zemin.
That evening, Li Peng appears on state television to declare martial law. “We must adopt firm and resolute measures to end the turmoil swiftly, to maintain the leadership of the party as well as the socialist system.”
For the first time in 40 years of Communist rule, the PLA troops attempt to occupy Beijing. A huge number of civilian protestors block their convoys on the streets. Beijingers begin a dialogue with the soldiers, trying to explain to them why they shouldn’t be there. “You had these … touching moments of the people appealing to the army to join them, and feeding them, and giving them water, and saying, you know, ‘Could be your son. Could be your daughter,'” a woman said, who was in Beijing at the time. “And you have these sort of doe-eyed, puzzled soldiers, who were mostly country people, weren’t experienced with big city life, just wondering what was going on here. And not wanting to hurt anybody.”
The soldiers have been ordered not to fire on civilians, even if provoked. They are stuck — unable to reach the protestors in Tiananmen Square and unable to withdraw from the city — for almost three days.
The troops finally are able to leave, but the government views the whole episode as another humiliation and challenge to its power. The party leaders feared that the whole edifice of communism was going to collapse.
Over the next week, the demonstrations continue, and Beijing operates with no real police presence and with a virtually free press. In Tiananmen Square, the atmosphere is jubilant, but at government headquarters, Deng Xiaoping is devising a new offensive to end the protest. Armed troops will be sent in from every military district in the country.
The Party elders approve the decision to put down the “counterrevolutionary riot” and clear the square with military force. Most hope it can be done without casualties. Unaware of what was about to happen, Hou Dejian, a Chinese rock star, and three prominent intellectuals start a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square. Demonstrators continue their sit-in and their calls for democratic reforms.
As word spreads that hundreds of thousands of troops are approaching from all four corners of the city, Beijingers flood the streets to block them, as they had done two weeks earlier. People set up barricades at every major intersection. At about 10:30 p.m., near the Muxidi apartment buildings — home to high-level Party officials and their families — the citizens become aggressive as the army tries to break through their barricades. They yell at the soldiers and some throw rocks; someone sets a bus on fire. The soldiers start firing on the unarmed civilians with AK-47s loaded with battlefield ammunition.
“The first rounds of fire catch everybody by surprise,” recalls human rights observer Timothy Brook. “The people in the streets don’t expect this to happen.” The wounded are taken to nearby hospitals on bicycles and pull-carts, but the hospital staff are unequipped to deal with the severe wounds. Muxidi sees the highest casualties of the night; an untold number of people are killed.
At about 1:00 a.m., the People’s Liberation Army finally reaches Tiananmen Square and waits for orders from the government. The soldiers have been told not to open fire, but they have also been told that they must clear the square by 6:00 a.m. — with no exceptions or delays. They make a final offer of amnesty if the few thousand remaining students will leave. About 4:00 a.m., student leaders put the matter to a vote: Leave the square, or stay and face the consequences. “It was clear to me that they stay votes were much, much, much stronger,” recalls eyewitness John Pomfret, who was near the students. “But Feng Congde, who was a student leader at the time, said, ‘The go’s have it.'” The students vacate the square under the gaze of thousands of soldiers.
Later that morning, some people — believed to be the parents of the student protestors — try to re-enter Tiananmen Square via Chang’an Boulevard. The soldiers order them to leave, and when they don’t, open fire, taking down dozens of people at a time. According to eyewitness accounts, the citizens seem not to believe the army is firing on them with real ammunition.
“After a little while, like 40 minutes, people would gather up their nerve again and would crawl back to the corner and start screaming at the soldiers, and then the commander would eventually give another signal … and they’d shoot more in the backs,” remembers journalist Jan Wong, who watched it all from her hotel room above the boulevard. “And this went on more than half a dozen times in the day.” When rescue workers try to approach the street to remove the wounded, they, too, are shot.
No one knows for certain how many people died over the two days. The Chinese Red Cross initially reported 2,600, then quickly retracted that figure under intense pressure from the government. The official Chinese government figure is 241 dead, including soldiers, and 7,000 wounded.
By the morning of June 5, the army is in complete control of Beijing. But when all protest in the city seems silenced, the world witnessed one final act of defiance.
About midday, as a column of tanks slowly moves along Chang’an Boulevard toward Tiananmen Square, an unarmed young man carrying shopping bags suddenly steps out in front of the tanks. Instead of running over him, the first tank tries to go around, but the young man steps in front of it again. They repeat this maneuver several more times before the tank stops and turns off its motor. The young man climbs on top of the tank and speaks to the driver before jumping back down again. Soon, the young man is whisked to the side of the road by an unidentified group of people and disappears into the crowd.
To this day, who he was and what became of him remains a mystery.
Death toll
Source: Chinese Red Cross
Source: Chinese Government
Watch what happened
Aftermath
During and after the demonstration, authorities attempted to arrest and prosecute the student leaders of the Chinese democracy movement, notably Wang Dan, Chai Ling, Zhao Changqing and Wuer Kaixi. Wang Dan was arrested, convicted, and sent to prison, then allowed to emigrate to the United States on the grounds of medical parole. As a lesser figure in the demonstrations, Zhao was released after six months in prison. However, he was once again incarcerated for continuing to petition for political reform in China. Wuer Kaixi escaped to Taiwan. He is now married and he holds a job as a political commentator on national Taiwan television . Chai Ling escaped to France, and then to the United States.
Chinese authorities summarily tried and executed many of the workers they arrested in Beijing. In contrast, the students – many of whom came from relatively affluent backgrounds and were well-connected – received much lighter sentences. Even Wang Dan, the student leader who topped the most wanted list, spent only seven years in prison.
Two CCTV presenters who reported the events of June 4 in the “News Network” program were fired soon after the event. Wu Xiaoyong, the son of a Communist Party of China Central Committee member, and former PRC foreign minister and vice premier Wu Xueqian were removed from the English Program Department of Chinese Radio International. Qian Liren, director of the People’s Daily (the newspaper of the Communist Party of China), was also removed from his post because of reports in the paper which were sympathetic towards the students.
The Party leadership expelled Zhao Ziyang from the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of China, because he opposed martial law, and Zhao remained under house arrest until his death. Hu Qili, the other member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China who opposed the martial law but chose not to vote instead of vetoing was also removed from the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, but he was able to retain his party membership, and after “Changing his opinion”, he was reassigned as vice-minister of Machine-Building and Electronics Industry. The other member who opposed the martial law by not voting instead vetoing it like Zhao Ziyang did was Qiao Shi, who was saved by his distant biological relationships with Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo because the need for Taiwan issue: although Qiao Shi was also removed from the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, he was transferred to a different job with equal rank, though the post was mostly ceremonial. Other reform minded Chinese leaders such as Wan Li was also put under house arrest immediately after he stepped out of the airplane at Beijing Capital International Airport upon returning from his shortened trip abroad, with the official excuse of “health reasons”. When Wan Li was released from his house arrest after he finally “changed his opinion” he, like Qiao Shi, was transferred to a different position with equal rank but mostly ceremonial role.
The event elevated Jiang Zemin – then Mayor of Shanghai who was not involved in this event – to become PRC’s President. Members of the government prepared a white paper explaining the government’s viewpoint on the protests. An anonymous source within the PRC government smuggled the document out of China, and Public Affairs published it in January 2001 as the Tiananmen Papers. The papers include a quote by Communist Party elder Wang Zhen which alludes to the government’s response to the demonstrations.
The Tiananmen square protests dampened the growing concept of political liberalization that was popular in the late 1980s; as a result, many democratic reforms that were proposed during the 1980s were swept under the carpet. Although there has been some increase in personal freedom since then, discussions on structural changes to the PRC government and the role of the Communist Party of China remain largely taboo.
Despite early expectations in the West that PRC government would soon collapse and be replaced by the Chinese democracy movement, by the early 21st century the Communist Party of China remained in firm control of the People’s Republic of China, and the student movement which started at Tiananmen was in complete disarray.
In Hong Kong, the Tiananmen square protests led to fears that the PRC would not honour its commitments under one country, two systems in the impending handover in 1997. One consequence of this was that the new governor Chris Patten attempted to expand the franchise for the Legislative Council of Hong Kong which led to friction with the PRC. There have been large candlelight vigils attended by tens of thousands in Hong Kong every year since 1989 and these vigils have continued following the transfer of power to the PRC in 1997.
The protests also marked a shift in the political conventions which governed politics in the People’s Republic. Prior to the protests, under the 1982 Constitution, the President was a largely symbolic role. By convention, power was distributed between the positions of President, Premier, and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, all of whom were intended to be different people, in order to prevent the excesses of Mao-style dictatorship. However, after Yang Shangkun used his reserve powers as head of state to mobilise the military, the Presidency again became a position imbued with real power. Subsequently, the President became the same person as the General Secretary of the CPC, and wielded paramount power.
The Chinese government drew widespread condemnation for its suppression of the protests. In the immediate aftermath, China seemed to be becoming a pariah state, increasingly isolated internationally. This was a significant setback for the leadership, who had courted international investment for much of the 1980s, as the country emerged from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution; however, Deng Xiaoping and the core leadership vowed to continue economic liberalization policies after 1989. From there on, China would work domestically and internationally to reshape its national image from that of a repressive regime to that of a benign global economic and military partner.
Although the crackdown hurt relations with Western countries, it had relatively little impact on China’s relations with its Asian neighbors Professor Suisheng Zhao, Director of the Center for China-US Cooperation at the University of Denver, attributes the slight impact to the fact that “the human rights records in most of these countries were not better than China’s. To a certain extent, they were sympathetic to China’s struggle against pressures from Western countries.” Even in the wake of the crackdown, China’s foreign relations with its neighbors generally improved.
In the 1990s, China attempted to demonstrate its willingness to participate in international economic and defense institutions to secure investment for continued economic reforms. The government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, the Convention on Chemical Weapons in 1993, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. Whereas China had been a member of only 30 international organizations in 1986, it was a member of over 50 by 1997. China also sought to diversify its external partnerships, establishing good diplomatic relations with post-Soviet Russia, and welcoming Taiwanese business in lieu of Western investment. China expedited negotiations with the World Trade Organization and established relations with Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, and others in 1992. While China was a net recipient of aid throughout the 1980s, its growing economic and military role transformed it into a net provider of aid.
Furthermore, the government has successfully promoted China as an attractive destination for investment by emphasizing its skilled workers, comparatively low wages, established infrastructure, and sizable consumer base. Increased foreign investment in the country led many world leaders to believe that by constructively engaging China in the global marketplace, larger political reforms would inevitably follow. At the same time, the explosion of commercial interest in the country opened the way for multinational corporations to turn a blind eye to politics and human rights in favor of focusing on business interests. Since then, Western leaders who were previously critical of China have sometimes paid lip service to the legacy of Tiananmen in bilateral meetings, but the substance of discussions revolved around business and trade interests.
One reason for this was that the Tiananmen protests did not mark the end of economic reform. Granted, in the immediate aftermath of the protests, conservatives within the Communist Party attempted to curtail some of the free market reforms that had been undertaken as part of Chinese economic reform, and reinstitute administrative controls over the economy. However, these efforts met with stiff resistance from provincial governors and broke down completely in the early 1990s as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Deng Xiaoping’s trip to the south. The continuance of economic reform led to economic growth in the 1990s, which allowed the government to regain much of the support that it had lost in 1989. In addition, none of the current PRC leadership played any active role in the decision to move against the demonstrators, and one major leadership figure Premier Wen Jiabao was an aide to Zhao Ziyang and accompanied him to meet the demonstrators. Today there are economic “sectors” in which business can thrive and this has improved the lives of many Chinese and opened up economic freedom and access to goods.
The students leaders at Tiananmen were unable to produce a coherent movement or ideology that would last past the mid-1990s. Many of the student leaders came from relatively well off sectors of society and were seen as out of touch with common people. A number of them were socialists and wanted to revert China back to the socialist road. Many of the organizations which were started in the aftermath of Tiananmen soon fell apart due to personal infighting. Several overseas democracy activists were supportive of limiting trade with mainland China which significantly decreased their popularity both within China and among the overseas Chinese community. A number of NGOs based in the U.S., which aim to bring democratic reform to China and relentlessly protest human rights violations that occur in China, remain. One of the oldest and most prominent of them, the China Support Network (CSN), was founded in 1989 by a group of concerned Americans and Chinese activists in response to Tiananmen Square.
Growing up with little memory of Tiananmen and no memory of the Cultural Revolution, but with a full appreciation of the rising prosperity and international influence of the PRC as well as the difficulties that Russia has had since the end of the Cold War, many Chinese no longer consider immediate political liberalization to be wise, preferring to see slow stepwise democratization instead. Many young Chinese, in view of PRC’s rise, are now more concerned with economic development, nationalism, the restoration of China’s prestige in international affairs, and perceived governmental weakness on issues like the political status of Taiwan or the Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan.
Among intellectuals in mainland China, the impact of the Tiananmen protests appears to have created something of a generation gap. Intellectuals who were in their 20s at the time of the protests tend to be far less supportive of the PRC government than younger students who were born after the start of the Deng Xiaoping reforms.
Among urban industrial workers, the continuation of market reforms in the 1990s brought with it higher standards of living as well as increased economic uncertainty. Protests by urban industrial workers over issues such as unpaid wages and local corruption remain frequent with estimates of several thousand of these protests occurring each year. The Communist Party of China appears unwilling to suffer the negative attention of suppressing these protests provided that protests remain directed at a local issue and do not call for deeper reform and do not involve coordination with other workers. In a reversal of the situation in 1989, the centre of discontent in mainland China appears to be in rural areas, which have seen incomes stagnate in the 1990s and have not been involved in much of the economic boom of that decade. However, just as the lack of organization and the distribution of peasants prevented them from becoming mobilized in support of the government in 1989, these factors also inhibit mobilization against the government in the early-21st century.
Interview with a leader
Three prominent leaders of the pro-democracy movement speak before a crowd in Tiananmen Square. From left, Chai Ling, Wuer Kaixi, and Wang Dan
CHINA: ’30 years after Tiananmen, the world witnesses the consequences of nurturing China’
4 June 2019 marks the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen crackdown in China when hundreds, if not thousands, of unarmed peaceful pro-democracy protesters were killed in Beijing and tens of thousands of demonstrators in cities across China were arrested.
In May 1989, people gathered in Tiananmen Square, in Central Beijing, to call for political and economic reform. Hundreds of student protesters went on hunger strike to put pressure on Communist Party leaders. An estimated one million people joined the protests to support the students and demand reform. The Chinese authorities responded with overwhelming repression. Military units were deployed and unarmed protesters and onlookers were killed en masse. The Chinese government never acknowledged the events surrounding the Tiananmen massacre. It remains a contentious topic to this day, and all mention of the protests is banned in China, both online and offline.
CIVICUS speaks to Wuer Kaixi, one of the leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and an iconic face of the movement. Wuer Kaixi fled China after the crackdown and now lives in exile in Taiwan. He has remained fiercely critical of the Chinese regime and is considered China’s second most-wanted dissident.
How did you get involved in the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement?
Throughout the 1980s student demonstrations took place every year. We made demands for the Chinese government to fulfil its promises to the people. The atmosphere at those times was such that everybody wanted to do something. Everybody was waiting for a window of opportunity to open. I was a freshman at Beijing Normal University and I got involved in the movement in its very early stages. I was among its founders and I was also on the organizing committee. I was also the founder of the student organization and an initiator of the hunger strike. That’s how I got involved. When opportunity presents, there will often be a someone to take a first step.
What factors led to the emergence of the movement at that time?
Throughout the 1980s the Chinese government, led by the Chinese Communist Party, seemed to offer a bright future for China. In fact, I think the 1980s were one of the best times for China in modern times. The Cultural Revolution had ended in the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping came to power. He presented the people of China with a slogan of openness and reform. It was a very appealing slogan, and everybody wanted the country to open up because its doors had been closed for a while. The opening provided us with an opportunity to see the outside world and get acquainted with Western ideologies. That made us feel very hopeful about China’s future.
But at the same time the government appeared very reluctant to undertake political reform, and we students thought the Chinese government’s speed in doing so was way too slow. In the early 1980s there were student demonstrations calling for democracy, and Hu Yaobang, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party back then, was very sympathetic to the students. But he was removed from his top-ranking leadership position in early 1987. This move indicated that anti-reformist hardliners had become more dominant, which was rather depressing.
What happened to you after the crackdown and how have you continued your activism?
After the crackdown I was listed number two on the Chinese most-wanted list, which contributed to my decision to flee China. I understood I would face very serious retribution. I realized at that time that if I and the rest of the protest leaders were arrested, we would probably be thrown in prison for life. So, I decided to escape, and with the help of many friends I managed to do it. The way I did it is also pretty amazing. I went through Hong Kong to the United States. Over the past 30 years I lived for the most part in three countries: first in France, for a year, then in the United States, where I went to continue my education, and then in Taiwan, where I moved in 1996. I have now lived in Taiwan for longer than I lived in China.
Three decades after the Tiananmen pro-democracy protests, what do you think the impact and legacy of this movement are?
Ours was a peaceful movement that demonstrated for democracy in China. The Communist Party responded to it with violence and literally crushed it with tanks, so of course from that perspective the movement failed. For the past 30 years the Communist Party has ruled China through the fear created by the Tiananmen massacre, followed by increased use of the security forces to suppress any form of dissent. The Chinese government has a budget for so-called ‘stability maintenance’ which has exceeded the national defense budget, so it is clear that ‘stability maintenance’ is code for internal suppression. The size of the Chinese national defense budget is already very scary for neighboring countries. So that’s how the Communist Party rules China. As a result, it is really hard to continue fighting for democracy in China.
That said, after Tiananmen Chinese people still kept fighting for their rights. And all of the political movements that followed took inspiration from the Tiananmen student movement. As a result, there are ongoing movements such as the Rights Defence Movement and the New Citizen’s Movement. And in 2008 there was the famous Charter 08 campaign, started with a manifesto signed by hundreds of dissident intellectuals and human rights activists. The Charter was published on 10 December 2008, the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and has since then been signed by more than 10,000 people both in and outside of China. In 2009, however, soon after the Charter was launched, Liu Xiaobo, one of its authors, was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment for ‘inciting subversion of state power’. He was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize while in prison, and he died in prison in 2017, even after being granted medical parole.
Have the conditions for the exercise of the fundamental freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression changed in any way since those events?
The situation has not improved in any way. Much to the contrary, China has become one of the worst factors threatening a world civilization founded on the value of fundamental freedoms. I think Western democracies led by the United States have opted for a very wrong kind of policy towards China. They call it ‘engagement’, but I call it ‘appeasement’. The policy of the West is to tolerate and even nurture what has become an extremely brutal totalitarian regime. For example, the Chinese government has rounded up more than a million ethnic Uyghur people. I myself am a Uighur. Uighurs back in China are in concentration camps. This is one of the worst human rights abuses since the Holocaust and the world does not seem to be fully aware of it. Alongside what it is doing internally, China is also trying to export its values to the world, becoming a clear and present danger to the world order and universal values.
What international support do activists inside and outside China need to help build greater respect for human rights and democratic freedoms in the country?
An important message that I would want to deliver to the world on the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, as a former student leader, is that at that time we thought we had the world’s support. We expected that support to last but it didn’t, and in the last days we felt betrayed and disappointed. Sadly, now the world is also having a taste of the consequences of nurturing China. The world has failed to see the true character of the Chinese authorities. They hoped that China would act like a responsible member of the world community and they acted on the basis of wishful thinking – and of course, things have not happened that way.
The Western world has assumed that China’s ruling party is actually a communist party, which it certainly is not. Xi Jinping talks about a ‘Rising Nation’, the ‘China Dream’ and other propaganda slogans. This is propaganda targeted at the Chinese people, aimed at gaining their support – but it is really not what the Communist Party is about. Very clearly, the Chinese Communist Party is just a group of usurpers who are ruling the largest country in the world, using their positions to loot the country. In other words, they are just common criminals, thugs and bandits. The world needs to treat them as what they are. If the world starts doing that – freezing their assets, imposing visa sanctions – I would say the situation would begin to change in a matter of weeks.
I would also urge all civil society organizations (CSOs) around the world to put pressure on their governments. Tell them that when they raise questions about human rights in China, we expect them to wait for an answer. Politicians involved in trade talks with China are under pressure from their own parliaments or media to raise these issues. But when they go to Beijing and raise human rights questions, they never wait for answers. This sends the Chinese regime the wrong message. So, CSOs around the globe must tell their government to wait for answers and make it clear they care about human rights. Democracies care about public opinion and CSOs are in a good position to shape public opinion.
